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HEY WALTER: Do CRIMINAL DEFENSE
LAWYERS NOT OWE FIDUCIARY DUTIES
TO GUILTY CLIENTS?
AN OPEN LETTER TO RETIRED
PROFESSOR WALTER W. STEELE, JR.*
Roy Ryden Anderson**
Dear Walter,
From time to time, as you doddle in your retirement in the piney
woods, you might recall that a few years ago we wrote a couple of articles
together about contract law and an attorney's professional responsibility.
I can't say the tasks were fun, legal writing being as it is so hard to do.
But the many conversations we had along the way were a lot of fun, at
least for me. I thought at the time I was learning a lot. Now I'm not so
sure I did.
I suppose now, you being retired and all, we can let the old cat out of
the bag. I was the one of us we anonymously referred to who professed
"little knowledge of the intricacies and nuances" of many of the rules
governing an attorney's professional responsibility.' You were the one
who didn't know a darn thing about contract law. Ha!
* I wish to thank my research assistants, Lisa Marie Antes and Paul K. Kirkpatrick,
for their help in the research for this letter and in helping with the footnotes insisted upon
by this publication's esteemed editors. Lisa and Paul are members of the Class of 2000. 1
will aver, under oath if necessary, to the editors of U.S. News and World Report that the
"2000" is in reference to the year they anticipate leaving these hallowed halls and not to
the size of their graduating class.
** The letter's author professes to be a member of the faculty of Southern Methodist
University School of Law (with tenure), a member of the State Bar of Texas (for the time
being), and a long-time colleague, friend, and student of Walter W. Steele, Jr. (probably for
always).
1. Roy Ryden Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Jr., Ethics and the Law of Contracts
Juxtaposed: A Jaundiced View of Professional Responsibility Considerations in the Attor-
ney-Client Relationship, 4 GEO. J. OF LEGAL ETHICS 791, 791 (1991). Walter, you are just
going to have to excuse these footnotes. I suspect they won't bother you much. I know for
a fact you never paid much attention to footnotes. I always thought it had something to do
with the small print and your eyesight. Man, I've never met a man with so many pairs of
eye glasses. I think you've got more peepers than boots, and that's saying something!
Anyway the only way I could get this open letter to you published in this journal is to put
footnotes on it. I think these guys will publish about anything if you put a footnote or two
on it. I sure don't trust getting a private letter to you out in the woods. Come to think of
it, do you even get mail out there? I hope so, because I'm getting the journal to send you a
free copy of this issue. I'm sure they cut your subscription when you retired.
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During your rational periods, and I do hope they come frequently
these days, you might recall that from the get go we had a devil of a time
even defining what we generally meant by "fiduciary obligation," the
most fundamental responsibility of an attorney to her client. It did give
us great solace that scholars and courts have long wrestled unsuccessfully
with the same problem.2 If memory serves me, and I'm sorry that I do
worry about yours, we didn't completely give up the ghost, but concluded
that the core essence of an attorney's fiduciary responsibilities to her cli-
ent included two basic principles: a duty of undivided loyalty to the client
and a duty to disclose fully to the client all matters pertaining to the en-
gagement that might affect the client's interests.3 I think we ultimately
agreed that virtually every fundamental attorney professional responsibil-
ity rule can be traced to or from one or both of those two basic principles.
Well, if I'm right about that, you are just not going to believe what our
friends down in Austin have come up with in their decision in the case
styled Peeler v. Hughes & Luce.4 This one may have come down shortly
before you retired. But I doubt you've seen it. Seems like you quit keep-
ing up and putting out a couple of years before you walked away. 5 But
then your students may just be telling tales on you again. Anyway, no
offense intended old buddy. I may do the same myself on down the road.
I mean, what are they gonna do to us?
Anyway, you might recall the day I was going to talk to you about the
Peeler case. The day, not my doing it. It didn't seem the right time for a
serious discussion. I ran into you while you were out in the law school
quad lecturing to that pack of squirrels on decorum and demeanor and
the difference between the two. Man, I thought, old Steele really must
miss the classroom. It was that day you were so mad, having just heard
that we had us a new dean. I am glad you didn't find him. Walter, you
are just hard on deans. Anyway, now that you are retired, you are going
to have to leave them alone. Besides, despite what you say, I do think it
is written somewhere that law schools have to have deans. But I could be
wrong about that.
But back to the Peeler case. Here's what happened. First about Mrs.
Peeler; she's the one who brought the case. Well, if the record is to be
believed, she got herself indicted by a federal grand jury on twenty-one
counts of criminal tax violations. Now Walter, that just sounds bad, cer-
2. See Roy Ryden Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Jr., Fiduciary Duty, Tort and Con-
tract: a Primer on the Legal Malpractice Puzzle, 47 SMU L. REV. 235, 236, 239-43 (1994).
3. See id.
4. 909 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. 1995).
5. Incidentally, do you still answer your phone with "Professor Steele"? You know
you can't do that anymore. I'm sure it would violate one of those canons or codes or
D.R.'s or such you're always talking about. You might try this: "This is the professor for-
merly known as Steele," but that sounds so lame. Also, I think it might be copyrighted.
Anyway, the point is you can't call yourself "professor" anymore, I don't think. Man, if I
had a name like "Steele," I'd just say "Steele"-and let the ducks fly! So you should not
feel so bad. "Professor" probably doesn't mean what it used to anyway.
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tainly not something we would wish for either of our daughters.6 But
think about it. I bet you and I know lots of folks (not you and me of
course) those IRS people could get that many indictments on. I mean its
not like she was accused of being an ax murderess, or a serial killer, or a
child molester, or like that. But here's the rub. She pleaded guilty to one
of those charges. And it must have been a doozy, because the Supremes
kept referring to her as a "convict," which I guess she was, her having
pled guilty and all. And they did convict her. She got fined, had to pay
restitution, and was given a five-year probated sentence instead of jail.7
But let me tell you what the Supremes said happened before all that. It
seems when Peeler, who was an officer in Hillcrest Equities, Inc., found
out that the IRS was conducting a federal criminal investigation of her
and some of her associates, including her husband, she went and hired a
lawyer to defend her.8 Mrs. Peeler paid him a $250,000 non-refundable
retainer! 9 But, Mrs. Peeler apparently got very good representation in
return. Her attorney got her a plea bargain agreement where twenty of
those twenty-one counts I told you about were dropped, as well as all
charges against her husband, in exchange for her "freely and voluntarily"
admitting guilt to one of the charges, something about helping one of
Hillcrest's customers file a fraudulent tax return.1 0 I don't know what all
that involved, but it must have been a really bad thing to do, because as I
said earlier, it branded her a "convict" in the eyes of the Supreme Court
of Texas and she got five-years probation and had to pay $250,000 as a
fine and in restitution.11
Now I bet the whole Peeler family was very happy with the deal, be-
cause Mom and Dad got to stay out of prison and could be home to care
for the Peeler children. 12 But it didn't last long. The happiness I mean.
It is basic to the law of contract-now stay with me Walter-that people,
even when initially thrilled with the deal they have made, tend to become
much less enchanted when they start thinking they could have made a
much better deal elsewhere. Well, that is just what the Court said hap-
pened here. Only three happy days passed before Mrs. Peeler heard
from a journalist a rumor suggesting that her lawyer may have prevented
her from getting off scot free. 13 The journalist told Mrs. Peeler that the
United States Attorney in charge of prosecuting her had made to her
lawyer a plea bargain offer earlier to the one she accepted, guaranteeing
6. I know; I don't have one. It's just an expression.
7. Actually I thought you had to serve jail time to be called a "convict." But I'm not
up on all these technical criminal law terms. You'd know better than I.
8. See Peeler, 909 S.W.2d at 495-96.
9. I've never understood how come you criminal defense lawyers get such big fees.
But I guess it does explain how a man your age gets to be retired.
10. Peeler, 909 S.W.2d at 496.
11. See id.
12. The Court tells us that one of the reasons given for Mom's agreeing to plead guilty
was "the personal emotional struggle she experienced over her concern for the care of her
young children if both she and her husband were convicted on all counts of the indictment
and consequently sentenced to lengthy prison terms." Peeler, 909 S.W.2d at 498.
13. See id. at 496.
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her and her husband complete immunity in exchange for cooperation in
the investigation. 14 Walter, any initial happiness over her plea bargain
apparently dissipated, because right away she brought suit against her at-
torney and his law firm.
She sued them for legal malpractice, violation of the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices Act, breach of contract, and breach of warranty. None of
her allegations, however, questioned the competence of her legal repre-
sentation. She was alleging an ethical violation, that her attorney did not
disclose to her the alleged plea bargain that would have granted her com-
plete immunity from prosecution. Nevertheless, I think you would agree
that, under Texas law, her allegations stated a valid claim of malpractice.
So you would think she would easily survive a summary judgment motion
against her. But it was the other way around. The trial court gave sum-
mary judgment against Mrs. Peeler and in favor of her lawyer and his law
firm on the ground that, since Peeler had been found guilty, the only
proximate or producing cause of her damages was her own guilt regard-
less of anything her lawyer or his law firm did or did not do. The trial
court's judgment was affirmed by the Dallas Court of Appeals, and the
case went on to the Supreme Court of Texas.
Now Walter, I think you would agree that, if we put to the side any
public policy concerns here, those two lower court decisions are just plain
wrong. And to see that you don't have to get into any kind of sophisti-
cated discussion about the fine distinction between proximate and pro-
ducing cause. That's good, because I have never talked to anyone who
could explain the difference in any meaningful way. We can all recite the
gibberish, but it is just that. We can say, in a given case, there can be
more than one of either or both, but that proximate cause has a foresee-
ability element, whereas producing cause does not. So where does that
get you? I think the distinction is just one of those things you have to be
a judge to understand and that it is one of those things that judges often
use to square doctrine with result, leaving the litigants totally confused as
to what really happened. But I digress. The important point is that both
kinds of causation have a so-called "cause in fact" element; i.e., you have
to show that in fact the wrong caused your loss. Both courts ruled that it
was Peeler's guilt that in fact caused her loss even if she could have
shown malpractice by her lawyer. That, of course, is clearly incorrect.
Assuming for purposes of summary judgment that her allegations against
her lawyer were true, his actions would in fact have caused her loss be-
cause she would have gone free regardless of her guilt had she accepted
the alleged plea bargain. All she would have had to prove at trial, other
than the existence of the offer, was that she would have accepted it had
she known of it. Were I on the jury, I don't think it would have taken
much for her to convince me of that by a preponderance of the evidence.
She did, after all, accept a much less advantageous deal later on. Of




required her to cooperate against her other business associates. But all
this simply raises fact issues, clearly material ones, and those issues with-
out a doubt make summary judgment against her claims wholly improper.
Anyway, her case went on to the Supreme Court of Texas. Along the
way, she had dropped her claims for breach of contract and warranty,
leaving before the Court only those for malpractice and violation of the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. I think that was a dumb move for
all kinds of reasons I won't get into here. Dropping those things I mean.
Well, it turns out that the case was really about public policy more than
causation and that it presented the Supreme Court of Texas with an issue
of first impression. Walter, let me tell you that you do not have to read
further than the first three sentences of the Supremes' opinion to know
just how the issue is going to come out. They said: "Carol Peeler com-
mitted a federal crime. She now sues her attorney because she was in-
dicted, convicted, and punished for that crime. We are asked to decide
whether Texas law permits her to do so."15
I think that what we have here is the Court posing a rhetorical 16 ques-
tion. I mean, how many different ways are you gonna answer that one
without getting shot? Which, incidentally, is another rhetorical question.
I mean, isn't all this a pretty good example of what we try so hard to
teach our students; i.e., that how you frame an issue for argument often
has a determinative effect on its outcome? I mean what if the issue had
been framed this way:
Does the general public policy of this state that prohibits allowing
guilty clients to sue their attorneys for simple malpractice override
this Court's fundamental responsibility for policing the legal profes-
sion when the client's allegations, if proved, demonstrate both a fun-
damental violation of our profession's time-honored ethical
standards and that the client would not otherwise have been found
guilty of the crime of which she was charged? 17
I bet most unbiased folks would find that question pretty easy to an-
swer as well, and I bet it would be opposite to the answer to the issue as
posed by the Court.
15. Id. at 495.
16. Excuse me, but I do realize "rhetorical" is a big word to be using in a letter one
friend to another. In fact you will find me using several big words here and there. Walter,
this is intentional and meant for your benefit. I bet you still remember most of these
words. But also remember that if you "don't use 'em, you lose 'em," and I know for a fact
you don't hear them or get to use them much out where you are. So keep with me on this
and feel free to sling a few of your own back at me whenever you get the notion.
17. Walter, I realize that these are a lot of words all in one sentence. You might be
looking for the verb in all this. Walter, there are lots of them. Verbs I mean. I think word
21 is the most important one, but I may be wrong about that. Another good one is word
66. My favorite one is word 27 just because you don't get to use it that often. Now in
doing your count remember that I am counting "time-honored" as just one word, not two.
But you can count it as two if you want to. But then you have to add one to the count of




Now Walter, at this point I have to make what I think is a very impor-
tant point. Because Mrs. Peeler is appealing a summary judgment ren-
dered against her, for the sake of argument, we, as did the Court, must
assume that all of the allegations in her complaint against her lawyer
were true. Her complaint did include a sworn affidavit from the prose-
cuting Assistant United States Attorney stating that he had made to her
lawyer "a definite, unambiguous offer" of immunity for all alleged wrongs
pertaining to the matters at issue "from the beginning of the world until
the end of time."'18 Now that kind of evidence might have bothered the
Court a bit, but then it may have thought that the prosecutor just had it in
for her lawyer. I mean the lawyer did get his client off with no jail time
and got twenty out of twenty-one counts completely dismissed. Seems
like he gave that prosecutor a real hard time. On the other hand, the
prosecutor's affidavit was supported by the sworn testimony of two IRS
agents.' 9 I bet the Court found the testimony of the IRS folks to be at
least facially plausible. I mean those guys have a long and proud history
of doing right. Or is IT the FBI I'm thinking about? But anyway, my
point is that, as we shall see, little things like logic, evidence, and facts
mattered not at all to our Supremes.
But, like the Court, we are assuming from this point on that her allega-
tions are true even though they may not have been. Now Walter, that
may not be a fair assumption, but it is one we have to make to appreciate
how awful the Court's opinion really is. I mean the Supremes' decision
leaves wrongly accused lawyers squarely on the horns of a conundrum, if
you know what I mean, and I think you do. The old "good news-bad
news" thing, Walter. The good news is that we can avoid trial on very
serious charges, the kind of charges of egregious wrongdoing that in and
of themselves both taint the accused and make people mad. The kind of
people who sit on juries, Walter. Jury trials, fraught as they are with the
unknown, are in themselves scary things. So I think a lot of us lawyers
are glad to hear that we will not have to run the risk and expense of jury
trials when angry clients wrongly accuse us in these kinds of cases.
But the bad news about the Peeler decision is that it does not GIVE
lawyers a REALISTIC opportunity to clear the air by refuting ostensibly
plausible evidence even when we are wrongly accused. But I'd still take
the summary judgment in a heartbeat even if I thought the evidence
against me was readily refutable. Wouldn't you? It'd be my luck to get a
jury that just didn't like lawyers.
But this conundrum is not the worst of the matter about the Court's
decision. When on that unhappy day, the Supremes had done their duty
for yet another day, and taken off their black robes, turned off the lights,
and, along with the other lawyers, the parties litigant, and everyone else,
gone on home, they sure left behind one malodorous mess with which the
rest of us have to deal. Those of us, like me Walter, who believe that the
18. Peeler, 909 S.W.2d at 500, n.1 (Hightower, J. concurring).
19. See id. at 496, n.1.
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Peeler case represents one of the worst decisions regarding legal ethics
ever written.20 I think you will agree that what makes the Court's deci-
sion so bad is both the nature of the allegations, since if proven true it
would have been her lawyer's wrong and not her alleged guilt that caused
her conviction, and the fact that the allegations were supported by
facially credible summary judgment evidence. So to criticize the Court's
decision I must emphasize both those things even though Mrs. Peeler's
allegations may not have been in fact true.
Walter, it puts me in mind of that television show "Law and Order,"
which must be very popular because, best I can tell, it is on some channel
most every night. So you must have seen it because I am sure these days
that channel surfing has become a very big part of your life. Anyway, I
have only seen it a time or two, me still being a working stiff and all, but
the ones I've seen go something like this. The first half of the show con-
cerns the crime and concentrates on the police gathering the evidence
and catching the alleged perpetrator. Walter, I'm telling you, when the
first half of the show is over you KNOW who did it. The evidence against
the alleged perpetrator is overwhelming. But that's just when the good
stuff starts, the second half of the show I mean. The second half focuses
on the trial and you get to watch the accused's lawyers pick apart the
state's case. To make a long story shorter, because I suspect you are well
ahead of me at this point, it usually turns out that the accused was inno-
cent and that all those facts either pointed in a different direction or were
not true.
So I think that's the kind of thing we may have here in the Peeler case.
Heck, we don't even have the kind of summary judgment where the de-
fendant has to admit all the factual allegations just for the sake of argu-
ment. In fact, speaking of facts, the fact is he vehemently denied them. It
was the Court that didn't care a whit what the facts were, other than the
fact of Peeler's admitted guilt. It decided the case purely on the basis of
public policy.
20. But even that is not the worst of it. Walter, I think this Peeler case may be with us
a long, long time. You know, if you are a court and you render a decision that makes fair-
minded folks cup their hands over their mouths and leave the room, there is some danger
those same folks may want to come back and discuss things further. Well, I think our
Dallas court (remember that is the one that wrote the Peeler case our Supremes sustained)
has made certain that is not likely to happen. Virtually as we were going to press on this
letter, the good court ruled that a cause of action by a found guilty client against his attor-
ney for legal malpractice was "frivolous" litigation as a matter of law, cited the Peeler case,
and sustained a sanction against the client and in favor of his poor attorney in the amount
of $1,000. Fortunately, the client was representing himself as a "pauper" or his new attor-
ney, if he could afford one, might have been in the soup as well. Now I'm not saying that
we lawyers lack gumption, but don't you think it is going to take a real special one of us to
challenge that Peeler case in the future? Which gets me to thinking, I may well be doing
something unethical here myself-criticizing the Peeler case, I mean. Walter, do me a
favor; go ahead and destroy this letter after you have read it! Oh, you want to know what
case I'm talking about? Take a look at Barnum v. Munson, Munson, Pierce & Cardwell,
998 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, no pet. h.).
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You know Walter, as a contracts lawyer, I can think of lots of ways both
sides of the Peeler case could have been telling the truth as they under-
stood it to be. So I don't even think we necessarily have the proverbial
lying contest going on here, if you know what I mean and I think you do.
I think you will agree that plea bargains are contracts and that courts all
across this country have long held that the basic rules of contract law
apply to them just like to any other contracts. And contracts often are
the product of lengthy and complex negotiations. I'll bet you, Walter, the
negotiations were not simple in the Peeler case. I mean it involved diffi-
cult issues of tax fraud, conspiracy, and that sort of stuff. Also, I think I
mentioned there were twenty-one separate indictments against Mrs.
Peeler alone! In that kind of setting, it is not hard to see that negotiations
between opposing counsel may have been ongoing and that what was or
was not "still on the table" could have varied from day to day. And
things that were conditional on one day, may have been intended by one
side to be unconditional the next. And vice versa. And so on. Walter, I
think you get my drift.
Well, if you do (get my drift, Walter), you will not be surprised to hear
that the law books are filled with cases in which no contract was found
because there was no common understanding. One side may have hon-
estly intended to make an offer and may honestly have understood a deal
was made, but the other side was honestly of a different understanding.
So that is part of my drift. The rest of it (my drift again, Walter) is that,
for all these reasons, when I say we must assume Peeler's allegations are
true it is solely for the sake of argument and should cast no inference
beyond that limited purpose.
We also may never know whether Mrs. Peeler was really guilty even
though she did admit guilt as part of her plea bargain. I could be wrong,
Walter, but I think lots of innocent people would plead guilty of a lesser
offense to avoid the possibility of conviction when circumstantial evi-
dence of a much greater offense is stacked heavily against them. I mean
some of us are just plain risk averse. Also, I just bet there are a bunch of
economists out there who would applaud as "efficient" (i.e., "intelligent")
a decision to plead guilty in such circumstances despite one's innocence.
And I bet they could put it all on graph paper for us! But we don't have
to worry about all that here. However, the Court makes much of the
facts that, not only did Peeler never assert her innocence of the charge to
which she pled guilty, she also admitted in deposition her guilt as to many
of the acts for which she was indicted. 2' So, for the sake of argument, we
will assume she was not only a "convict" but a guilty one at that. But that
doesn't mean we should consider her some demonic threat to society who
escaped incarceration only through the superb negotiating skills of her
lawyer. It turns out that the plea bargain she agreed to included "a rela-
tively short prison sentence," and indeed that is what the prosecutor rec-
21. See id. at 498.
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ommended to the criminal trial judge.22 It strikes me as of some
importance that the trial judge, nevertheless, decided to give her proba-
tion instead. Charlotte Manson here we have not!
Walter, there is not a whole lot to say about the Supremes' opinion,
which was, by the way, a vote of five to three with one judge not sitting.
As I said earlier, after the first three sentences it was not in doubt how
the case was going to come out. But I do bet you're wondering how the
court was going to get around the problem that even Elmer Fudd could
see that in this case, if Peeler's allegations are taken as true, her lawyer's
alleged wrongdoing would have caused her conviction and any accompa-
nying damages. I bet you are thinking that once again the Court would
blow us away with the customary brilliant legal reasoning and judicial
eloquence. Nope! It just made very clear from the very beginning that
the very simple facts of the case were not going to leave it very confused
for very long. The Court said that, regardless of the facts, it was against
the public policy of the great State of Texas for a convict who had not
subsequently proved her innocence to assert that the cause in fact of her
predicament was anything other than her own guilt. Now Walter, that
may not make a lot of sense, and it may not be right, but it is darn sure
effective. I mean who gets to say what the public policy of the GREAT
STATE OF TEXAS is? Case closed. I think you have to go to the legisla-
ture and get a statute passed to get around the Court's decision as to
public policy. You darn sure aren't going to get anywhere with logic or
pleading to their better side, at least not in this kind of case. The Chief
Justice and two other judges on the Court tried mightily, but to no avail.
But more about that later.
Back to this public policy thing. The Court said that, in a malpractice
suit by a guilty client against her attorney, public policy demanded that
her criminal conduct be, as a matter of law, the cause in fact of her sorry
state because otherwise she might shift responsibility for her crime away
from herself, perhaps even profit from her own wrong, and such a result
"would indeed shock the public conscience, engender disrespect for
courts and generally discredit the administration of justice. '23 Now Wal-
ter, I do not want to anger you here, you being a staunch Democrat and
me maybe not having quite seen the light, but I generally agree with the
Supremes' sentiment, although I do doubt that, given recent events at the
national level, there is very much that would "shock" what little is left of
the public conscience. But as usual the Chief Justice made the crucial
point as well as anyone could. He said that, if we allowed any other rule,
"most criminal convictions might simply be a prelude to a civil malprac-
tice suit."' 24 Boy do I agree with that! And I'm against it. The prelude
thing I mean. In fact, I think most incarcerated criminals would other-
22. Id. at 496.
23. Id. at 497. This last part was not the Court's own words. It was quoting from State
ex rel O'Blennis v. Adopf, 691 S.W.2d 498, 504 (Mo. App. 1985), which was in turn quoting
from In re Estate of Laspy, 409 S.W.2d 725, 737 (Mo. App. 1966). You with me?
24. Peeler, 909 S.W.2d at 501 (Phillips, CJ., dissenting).
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wise give suing their lawyer a shot as a last resort no matter what. I
mean, why not? They probably have little else to do with their time, and
if they happen to hit the big ole litigation "lottery," they might be in
candy and cigarettes and other prison "essentials" for the remainder of
their sentence. But more to the point, even if the convict's attorney did
mess up by doing some malpractice, who is to say that the jury would not
have found guilt even if the case had been perfectly tried? I like to think
that juries do have an uncanny ability to ferret out the truth no matter
how bumbling the lawyers on either side of a case happen to be. So that's
part of where me and the Chief Justice are coming from, and boy am I
proud about being able to say that. Being together with the Chief Justice
I mean. But there's more. The Chief Justice also points out that, of all
the cases relied on by the majority opinion from at least ten different
jurisdictions, not one of them was like Mrs. Peeler's case. Not one of
them involved a situation where the "convicted" person OFFERS TO show
that the actual "cause in fact" of her predicament was her attorney's al-
leged fault and not hers!
Well Walter, he unfortunately was wrong about that. So this is where I
get a bit concerned. I did mention, didn't I, that I am on the Chief Jus-
tice's side on this one? It turns out one of those cases cited by the major-
ity Supremes was almost right on point with the point they were making
and the decision they were reaching. But they didn't single it out, and I
think, as good lawyers, they would have had they known it. More impor-
tantly, I don't think the Chief Justice knew it either, or, as an honorable
man, he would not have said what he said. Walter, it gets worse. One of
the cases cited by the majority Supremes is also directly on point, but also
directly against them. It seems real clear to me that they did not know
that, or I am sure they would have mentioned it. That same case, of
course, is directly on point for the Chief Justice's position, and yet he
does not mention it at all. Am I missing something? Is this not a case of
first impression in the Supreme Court of Texas on a provocative and im-
portant issue of great concern, not only to lawyers, but to the general
public as well? And yet we have opinions on both sides of the case that
reflect rather clearly that the good judges haven't carefully read the cases
they are making reference to. Does that concern you, too? Now, I do
not want to get "holier than thou" on all this. I have not read all those
cases either. Forgive me, but I think I have more productive things to do.
And if I do, I feel sure that the good judges certainly do. Have more
productive things to do, I mean. I don't read a lot of cases. My research
assistant does. Now he has told me what they are all about in this case
and what they all had to say. But, bless him, I do not think that he had
any idea of the ramifications of what he was telling me. My point is sim-
ply this. Who is researching cases for our judges down in Austin? I bet it
is not SMU graduates. So, there you go.
All right Walter, I never could fool you. I am not a bit concerned. But
I am a little embarrassed. How about you? Let me tell you about those
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two cases. In Glenn v. Aiken, 25 the court applied the majority rule that
the criminal defendant must first prove his innocence before he may
maintain a cause of action against his attorney for simple malpractice. In
dictum, however, the court opined that the rule might not apply to a situ-
ation where it is clear that, regardless of the client's actual guilt, the attor-
ney's malpractice was the actual cause of the conviction. The situation
contemplated by the court was one in which the attorney had negligently
failed to plead the running of a statute of limitations on the charge
against his client. The court correctly noted that that would be a situation
completely different from the one before it, and it reserved for the future
judgment on that issue. The court did note, however, that it might "be
difficult to defend logically a rule that requires proof of innocence as a
condition of recovery, especially if a clear act of negligence of defense
counsel was obviously the cause of the defendant's conviction of a
crime."'26 Well Walter, I think our good Court kinda misled us by citing
this case in support of its decision. Clearly, the court in Glenn reserved
judgment when the issue was one like Mrs. Peeler's. However, I can't say
I blame our own Court very much. The issue posed by the court in Glenn
involved only simple malpractice, the failure to plead a statute of limita-
tions defense. Heck, that could happen to anybody. I didn't even know
they had statutes of limitations on crimes. Whose idea was that anyway?
I mean, it is not like the attorney in the hypothetical did anything like the
allegations Mrs. Peeler was making. But I may be wrong about that. I
think I told you I tend to vote Republican.
The other case disturbs me much more, if you even care, which I think
you do. The case is Krahn v. Kinney.27 It is especially surprising that the
Chief Justice did not make a big deal of it in his dissenting opinion in the
Peeler case, because the facts were so similar to, and it supported so
strongly, the position he was taking. In Krahn, the attorney had failed to
communicate an offer by the prosecutor to dismiss all charges against
Krahn in return for her willingness to testify against another defendant.
Now the majority Supremes do make reference to the case, but as an
example of the minority rule, and they pooh pooh the case for not ad-
dressing the policy considerations of the majority of courts that impose an
innocence requirement. Now Walter, aren't they being a little unfairly
nasty here? I mean, why would that other judge address policy consider-
ations of cases he thought completely different from the one he was con-
sidering? I mean, that was his point. His case was different from the
25. 569 N.E.2d 783 (Mass. 1991).
26. Id. at 787 (footnote omitted). However, the court opined that it might follow the
"innocence rule" regardless. The court then cited to a law review article that noted that
requiring proof of innocence in such cases "just about destroys criminal malpractice as an
actionable tort in the very type of situation where the lawyer's incompetence is most fla-
grant and its consequence most easily demonstrable." See O.M. Kaus & R.E. Mallen, The
Misguiding Hand of Counsel - Reflections on "Criminal Malpractice", 21 UCLA L. REV.
1191, 1205 (1974). 1 wouldn't have mentioned the article at all Walter, except I know how
you like hyperbole.
27. 538 N.E.2d 1058 (Ohio 1989).
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majority ones. Anyway, that other judge did point to the following policy
consideration in the case before him (and our Supremes ignore that pol-
icy consideration, so that makes the judges even in my mind, how about
in yours?):
The inequity of requiring a plaintiff to obtain a reversal of his or her
conviction before bringing a malpractice action is apparent from the
facts in the present case. [The attorney's failure to communicate the
plea bargain offer forced his client] into the situation of having to
plead to a more serious charge or risk a still greater conviction and
sentence .... As aptly stated by the court of appeals, the injury in
such a situation "is not a bungled opportunity for vindication, but a
lost opportunity to minimize her criminal record. '2 8
Now Walter, I do not want to get bogged down in a lot of detail con-
cerning this court said this and this other court said that.29 I just thought
it was interesting that the judges who wrote the opinions in the Peeler
case did not much care what the other courts actually said either. But, in
this case, I kinda agree with that kind of attitude. Something else I agree
with, and this may surprise you. I agree with the Supremes that the case
should have been decided on a public policy basis. It's just that I think
they were enforcing the wrong public policy. I realize a little policy dis-
cussion at this point may bore you to tears, but I think it, along with the
few footnotes below, may just ensure that this letter to you gets pub-
lished. Law review editors love policy discussion in law review articles.
But, you take those same editors, put them in a classroom, and they hate
it like the dickens. Go figure.
Now assuming for purposes of summary judgment that Peeler's allega-
tions against her lawyer were true, such behavior by a criminal lawyer
would certainly be a very unethical and bad thing to do to a client. And
Walter, I think you would agree that the matter would be much less prob-
lematic if the plaintiff alleged only that the attorney just forgot about the
alleged plea bargain offer. And if that was the case, then that would be
very negligent of him and would certainly be malpractice. But I don't
have any big policy concern about that. You, however, may feel differ-
28. Id. at 1061 (footnote omitted). Now Walter, I do not want to get real serious all of
sudden here. But I am not sure I am making clear enough a very important point.
Although the Court would have us believe that it is following the strong majority rule in
the Peeler case, it is not. Quite to the contrary, the Court's decision is the only one I have
been able to find in which the "innocence rule" was applied to protect an attorney where
the attorney's alleged wrongdoing would clearly have caused the client's conviction. I
think the "innocence rule" is a very good rule that should have no application to such a
case. The two cases I have been talking about are the only two I have found that address
the narrower issue, one by way of dictum, and both of those cases sure seem to agree with
me.
29. But I do need to mention one more case. I'm putting this one in because it ought
to just about guarantee that the law review will want this letter in their journal. I mean it's
a brand new case out of the California Supreme Court. The Court, in a case of first impres-
sion for it, adopted the "innocence" rule I have been talking about. See Wiley v. County of
San Diego, 966 P.2d 983 (Cal. 1998). 1 found it reported in 14 ABA/BNA Lawyer's Man-
ual on Professional Conduct #14, pp. 573-574 (Dec. 1998). Don't bother reading it or the
case, Walter. Same old, same old.
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ently being a Democrat and all. And I can see your point. What does it
matter IF he just forgot, when in all logic that forgetfulness would have
been the cause in fact of his client's conviction? Walter, this is another
rhetorical question, except this time I think it's yours. It would certainly
be illogical in a case like that to hold, as a matter of law, that the cause in
fact of his client's conviction was her own guilt. But let's not beat that
dead horse. The Supremes, at least most of them, have already consid-
ered the point, and I guess I will go along with them.
But this apparently was not a case of failed memory, Walter. Her law-
yer adamantly maintained that he was never told about the offer for his
client by the prosecutor. 30 The allegations by Peeler acted to refresh no
recollection. Walter, that is what makes this case so disturbing, don't you
think? I mean, what has been alleged here is not a simple case of mal-
practice like where lawyers make mistakes because of oversight or forget-
fulness. You know, Walter, the sort of things that tends to happen to
retired folk. What we have here, if anything, is an egregious violation of
the fiduciary duty to disclose a plea bargain offer for a client. Now nor-
mally such an allegation is patently absurd because there is no reason a
criminal lawyer will not happily communicate to his client an offer of
complete immunity from prosecution. But Mrs. Peeler did actually sug-
gest a plausible reason. Remember I told you that at least one other
defendant in the matter was represented by another member of her law-
yer's law firm.31 She alleged that her lawyer purposefully did not tell her
about the offer of a plea bargain because he was being loyal to the other
defendants and, I suppose, to any colleagues or friends who were repre-
senting them. 32 It seems that about the time of the immunity offer for
Mrs. Peeler, her lawyer and the rest of them were trying to get together
30. See Peeler, 909 S.W.2d at 500 (Hightower, J., concurring). See also, Peeler v.
Hughes & Luce, 868 S.W.2d 823, 826, n.1 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ granted).
31. See Peeler v. Hughes & Luce, 868 S.W.2d 823, 826, n.2 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993,
writ granted). Now Walter, isn't this fact in and of itself bothersome? I mean, does not
Rule 1.06 of our Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, dealing as it does with
conflict of interest, counsel against a law firm representing multiple defendants in criminal
litigation? Comment 11 to Rule 1.06 even lists fraud as a type of action to which the rule
should apply. So I do not think that the law firm representing multiple defendants was a
good idea. However, the rule does make exception for cases in which all the clients con-
sent to the representation after full disclosure. Also, Comment 17 of the rule says that: "In
a criminal case, inquiry by the court is generally required when a lawyer represents multi-
ple defendants." But the spirit of the rule, its rationale, is clearly articulated (another big
word, Walter) by Comment 3:
An impermissible conflict [of interest] may exist or develop by reason of sub-
stantial discrepancy in the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in
relation to an opposing party or the fact that there are substantially different
possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question. The potential
for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is
so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one co-
defendant. [Emphasis added.]
Boy Walter, it sure seems to me our ethics rule makers were thinking about the Peeler kind
of situations when they wrote Rule 1.06.
32. See Peeler, 868 S.W.2d at 826.
1999]
SMU LAW REVIEW
on a tactic known as the "Gideon Initiative. ' 33 Walter, I suppose you
being a criminal lawyer and all, you know right away what that means.
But in case you don't, it has to do with sending a representative to D.C.
to see if you can sweet talk the IRS into prosecuting the case against the
various defendants as a civil rather than a criminal matter. Now I don't
know if that is or was a good idea or not. But I do know anyone with
both oars in the water would prefer a deal for complete rather than par-
tial immunity.
Walter, remember that I mentioned earlier that my recollection is we
decided that the hallmark responsibilities of an attorney to his client are
undivided loyalty and full disclosure. Well, if the Court is going to let
criminal lawyers get away with concealing offers of immunity from their
clients, it seems to me that sort of blows both those ideas out of the water.
And, to continue the nautical metaphor, hasn't our good Court given at-
torneys who have sold their clients down the river one heck of an incen-
tive to go ahead and sink the boat they put their clients on? I mean, once
an attorney has messed up that badly, isn't it in his own best interest to
make every subtle effort to make sure that his client is ultimately found
guilty so that he will be immuned 34 from liability to his client?
Now leaving that kind of behavior unpunished must itself be against
some kind of public policy. So, what I think we have here is two compet-
ing public policies: the one that justifies the "innocence" rule in criminal
malpractice cases and one that requires the courts to police lawyer behav-
ior, particularly with respect to egregious violations of our standards of
professional ethics. I know you remember that just a few years ago we
wrote an article together suggesting to the courts that it was a big mistake
to "lump" all kinds of non-contract actions by clients against attorneys
under the broad rubric "malpractice." It seems to me that the Peeler case
is a good example of why we were right. And I know for a fact that other
folks and courts are beginning to think along the same lines.35 In fact, the
Supreme Court of Texas is presently considering doing just that. The
Court is considering the question of whether to affirm a judgment requir-
ing an attorney to forfeit back to his client his fee where his malpractice,
33. See id. at 826, n.2.
34. I'm not sure "immuned" is the right word here, Walter. But I'm sure our editors
will pick it up, if it is not.
35. For example, you and I are cited, with apparent approval, in the draft of the new
Restatement of the Law of The Law Governing Lawyers § 71, Reporter's Note (Tentative
Draft No. 8, 1997). It trumpets that there are "different approaches to the classification of
claims for breach of fiduciary duty." It refers to both our article on the "Legal Malpractice
Puzzle" I mentioned earlier, and to David Welsh Co. v. Erskine & Tulley, 250 Cal. Rptr.
339 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (claim for misuse of confidential information described as breach
of fiduciary duty and thus not subject to malpractice statute of limitations). Also, I found a
couple of other cases that deserve mention. See Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy v.
Boon, 13 F.3d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1994) (strict "but for" causation of damages not required to
prove breach of fiduciary relationship); Arce v. Burrow, 958 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, affd in part & rev'd in part, 997 S.W.2d (Tex. 1999). (client
entitled to remedy of fee forfeiture for breach of fiduciary duty even though no proof
shown that breach caused financial loss).
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although it did not cause his client any provable monetary loss, repre-
sented a breach of fiduciary duty.36 I sure wish the Court would have
considered that kind of distinction when it took on the Peeler case. I
think it might have led it to the right result, a conclusion that the public
policy of punishing fundamental violations of a lawyer's ethical standards
does after all transcend the public policy reflected in the "innocence"
rule. Instead, what we have in the Peeler case is yet another example in
what I think is a growing line of recent examples of our Court failing to
make fine distinctions in cases in which justice requires that fine distinc-
tions be made.
Walter, if I am following all of this, the Supremes are cutting some
ethical slack for criminal defense lawyers when, if the case was about the
other kind of lawyer, the lawyer's insurance carrier might be writing Mrs.
Peeler one big check. Should not it be the other way around? I mean it
ought to be, if anything, that the criminal lawyer is expected to act with a
higher degree of ethical conduct and, if he does not, his client can nail his
financial hide to the wall. If the other kind of lawyer, like I am, allows his
client to be sold down the river, it is only the financial river, Walter. But,
if a criminal lawyer does that to his client, we are talking about the cli-
ent's life, liberty, and the pursuit of a good name. Even if the client
doesn't wind up incarcerated or, even worse, get to meet "Old Sparky,"
the client is branded a criminal for life (or death). Which, incidentally, is
exactly what happened to Mrs. Peeler. So, it seems to me that criminal
defense lawyers should have more expected of them, not less. I think we
have here what you call an irony, Walter.
I think, for most folks, one of the scariest things that can happen to you
is to get involved as an accused in the criminal justice system, particularly
the federal one. I know it would scare the heck out of me, and I am a
lawyer; it is just that I am the other kind of lawyer. Man, I would get for
me the very best criminal defense lawyer I could find, and I would close
my eyes, cross my fingers, and put my trust completely in her. I mean, if
she said jump and whistle, Walter you would be seeing a very funny sight,
36. This is the Arce case I mentioned in the footnote right above.
And lo and behold, Walter. Darned if they did not do just that about the time this old
letter was going to press. On July 1, 1999, the Court held that an attorney who breaches his
fiduciary obligation to his client may be required to refund to the client all or part of his fee
whether or not the client can show that the breach has caused him any actual damages.
Justice Hecht put the rationale quite eloquently:
The rule is founded both on principle and pragmatics. In principle, a person
who agrees to perform compensable services in a relationship of trust and
violates that relationship breaches the agreement, express or implied, on
which the right to compensation is based. The person is not entitled to be
paid when he has not provided the loyalty bargained for and promised.
Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 237-38 (Tex. 1999). Now Walter, you may think that our
Supremes have gone and undermined the whole philosophy of the Peeler case. But I don't
think so. I don't think the lawyer's insurance company is liable here at all. I don't think a
malpractice policy covers fee refunds, but just damages caused by the malpracticing lawyer.
But I could be wrong about that.
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because I don't do either one of those very well anymore, if you know
what I mean and I think you do.
Also, if I happened to be a righteous criminal defense lawyer, I would
be ticked at this Peeler case, because I would think I was a special kind of
lawyer and I would think most people thought I was too. I mean think
about it. Walter, if you made up a list of the top ten lawyers of all time,
or the present time, that you regard as heroes, I bet you that almost all of
them, maybe all of them, would be criminal defense lawyers. And my list
would look about the same. And I think the same would be true for most
people. I mean the great criminal defense lawyers are the "knights" of
our profession. If I was one of them, I would not be a bit happy with the
Supreme Court of Texas for not holding our esteemed selves to the high-
est of standards.
Now, Walter, don't let me leave you with the impression that the Court
in the Peeler case condoned the type of wrongdoing alleged by Mrs.
Peeler. One judge even referred to it, if true, as "reprehensible and un-
conscionable. ' 37 And the majority opinion made the specific point that
nothing in the opinion "should be construed as relieving criminal defense
attorneys of their responsibility to maintain the highest standards of ethi-
cal and professional conduct. '38 It was the view of five good justices,
however, that a convicted criminal defendant's only appropriate recourse
would be to file a grievance against her lawyer with the appropriate State
Bar disciplinary committee. AS IF! I mean, what are the odds? And
what would be in it for the convicted client other than righteous vindica-
tion? Walter, these are rhetorical questions again. It seems to me that
for the client to pursue the matter further would be throwing good money
after bad, metaphorically speaking. The emotional cost alone would
surely prove enormous. You can bet any lawyer in this kind of case
would vigorously defend himself at any disciplinary hearing, and that his
defense without doubt would include hammering again and again on all
the alleged wrongdoing of his client and generally making things as hard
as he could for that client. I kind of doubt a client would want to put up
with all of that unless some kind of monetary award was at least a possi-
bility. You know, the big ole litigation lottery.
Also, I can see where at this point a client in Mrs. Peeler's shoes might
be inclined to a rather dim view of getting any kind of justice from law-
yers against lawyers. I mean, Peeler had pursued redress for her alleged
injuries through three different Texas courts. And she not only lost, she
got "poured out" by a summary judgment that refused to allow her the
right to present the claim to a jury of her peers. Do you suppose the
courts, all three of them, may have been worried about allowing those
peers to hear the case? I mean would you want to let the "public" decide
important things like public policy? Me neither.




It is my opinion that, next to law professors, judges are about the most
esteemed kind of lawyer in the public's mind, but I may be wrong about
that. If I am not though, then I think it is fair to say that the whole
process really put a damper on Mrs. Peeler's enthusiasm for our justice
system. I mean, if my head count is right, she talked to twelve different
judges in three different courts and nine of them poured her out. Walter,
that is almost three out of every four! Truth be known, I think even "con-
victs" think highly of judges, at least when comparing them to other kinds
of lawyers. So, what kind of chance do you think Mrs. Peeler thought she
had of successfully pleading her case to a disciplinary committee com-
posed of just regular kinds of lawyers? Walter, that might be my last
rhetorical question.
So I think we can assume that Mrs. Peeler has been put right out of the
picture. But where does that leave us? I mean we have been having to
assume all along for the sake of argument, as did the Court, that Mrs.
Peeler's accusations were true. Walter, those kinds of facially plausible
allegations on the public record of a Supreme Court of Texas opinion are
not good for our profession. Our profession needs help here and, as you
know, we as lawyers are encouraged, and sometimes bound, to give that
help if we have knowledge of possible violations of our ethical rules of
professional conduct. 39 But nobody I know likes this "snitch" rule very
much, and I certainly do not. It is sometimes called the "squealer" rule
or the "whistle blower" rule. But I call it the "snitch" rule, because I
think to call it the "squealer" rule is an insult to pigs, which do make
good family pets, and to little children, and to call it the "whistle blower"
rule is an insult to people who blow whistles but do not "snitch." But it is
one of our Texas rules of professional responsibility even though proba-
bly most of us are reluctant to follow it, and I would surely admire and
respect another lawyer who did see fit to abide by it. Walter, has it oc-
curred to you how many different lawyers were involved directly and in-
directly in the Peeler case, many of them wearing black robes? I do not
think it stretches things to say that many lawyers had knowledge that
allegations of ethical misconduct had been made against a member of our
profession. Do you think that, out of all of those lawyers, some of them
wearing black robes and others not, at least one of them saw fit to bring
39. Rule 8.03 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct provides: "... a
lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of applicable rules
of professional conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trust-
worthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate disciplinary
authorities." Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof. Conduct 8.03(a) (1990). See also Canon 3 of the
Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires a judge who has "knowledge that a lawyer
has committed a violation of the Texas Disciplinary Rules" to take appropriate action or
inform the appropriate agency of the State Bar. These rules are far from clear, particularly
regarding what constitutes "knowledge" for their purposes. So I think it is arguable who, if
anyone, was "required" to refer the allegations in the Peeler case. Nevertheless, our ethical
rules state only minimum standards of conduct, and I think it fair to say these particular
rules did encourage many of the lawyers close to the Peeler case to have taken action.
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to the attention of the appropriate agency the accusations against the at-
torney? Or am I just being naive?
Well Walter, if that did not happen, I think I may know why that unfor-
tunately is. I think the Supreme Court of Texas has, maybe without in-
tention, put a further "chilling effect" on a lawyer's reluctant willingness
to snitch on another lawyer. I say "reluctant willingness" because I think
a lawyer knows that, when he does decide to snitch on another lawyer,
that other lawyer, all his lawyer friends, and maybe lots of other lawyers
are going to be real mad at the snitching lawyer. So, unless it is that he
just has it in for the lawyer he is reporting, I think any lawyer who
snitches on another lawyer does so reluctantly. I also think he knows
what he is getting into when he does it. Lots of lawyers being mad at him,
I mean. But I also think that he supposes that the Supreme Court of
Texas and the State Bar of Texas will protect him from retaliation by
other lawyers for his doing his ethical duty.
The Supreme Court of Texas has recently made clear, however, that the
two of us are real dummies, me for thinking that and the "snitcher" for
supposing that. The case I have in mind, Walter, is Bohatch v. Butler &
Binion.40 Well, what happened in that case is that Ms. Bohatch thought,
apparently in good faith, that one of her partners in the law firm was
overbilling his clients. Bohatch, however, did not immediately run to the
nearest State Bar disciplinary committee making hysterical accusations
against her partner. Instead, she quietly brought it to the attention of the
"powers that be" in her law firm. The law firm conducted an investiga-
tion and found, thank goodness, that no overbilling occurred. Now, Wal-
ter, that is plenty good enough for me. But, with no offense intended
either to the firm or to foxes, isn't that kind of like a pack of foxes deter-
mining that all those chickens died of very bloody, natural causes? But I
do think institutionalized lawyer overbilling is even rarer than chronic
chicken nosebleed.
You are probably ahead of me on this, but the "snitcher" was fired by
the law firm. She, in turn, sued the firm, alleging that it had no right to
discharge her for doing what she in good faith believed to be her ethical
duty. Well, the Court quickly put a "quietus" on that idea. It said that,
regardless of Bohatch's good faith and even regardless of whether her
allegations against her partner turned out to be true, she had no cause of
action against other lawyers who retaliated against her for her ethical
"snitching." 41 Well, how can that be, you might ask. Walter, public policy
again. The Court reasoned that any policy in favor of protecting ethical
"snitchers" was outweighed by a policy against forcing lawyers to remain
with each other in untenable relationships, which might result if they
40. 977 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1998).
41. Walter, if you are really interested, you can find a fuller discussion of the case in
the following very helpful article: Bruce A. Campbell, To Squeal or Not to Squeal: A
Thinking Lawyer's Guide to Reporting Lawyer Misconduct, 62 TEX. BAR J. 22 (1999). Or
you could just read the case, which I know you will not.
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could not retaliate with impunity against ethical "snitchers." I mean can
you think of anything much worse than having to work every day with
another lawyer you do not like, particularly one who is a "snitcher"? I
for one am very glad that the Court took the time to bring that policy to
my attention. Walter, and I guess I can say this proudly now, over the
past thirty years or so there have been, on occasion, members of this
faculty at SMU who I just did not like, if you know what I mean, and I
think you do. I do think most of them are long gone for other reasons,
but if I did think hard about it, which I won't, there still may be one or
two around. I am glad to hear that there is a public policy that says that I
do not have to put up with that. However, I am somewhat concerned
that, over the years, there may have been one or two faculty members
who just did not like me. I know, Walter, but just suppose. But I do feel
sure that, if there ever were, they are long gone, or at least I hope so.
Walter, I know that you, being now retired, no longer have a dog in this
fight. The Dean has told us, as part of this appreciation law journal issue
to you, that we are all supposed to say that we all like and miss you. And
I know, in reply, you will say that you like and miss all of us.
So, maybe this is not such a bad public policy for our Court to establish.
But Walter, the thing I do not like about the public policies found by the
Court in the Peeler and Bohatch cases is that they sure seem calculated to
protect bad lawyers and their insurance carriers. Which gets me to think-
ing. Walter, when is it that was the last time a lawyer or an insurance
company lost a case in Austin brought against them? I do think it has
been a good while, but I could be wrong about that. In case you think I
might be being unduly harsh here, Walter, let me tell you about just one
more case.42 Think of it as just another example of what I am talking
about. But Walter, it is as good an example as examples get. Now I will
be brief because this letter is already getting too long and because the
case probably deserves a whole letter itself. The case involves a bunch of
sophisticated contract law, which I am not going to get into and which I
am just going to ask you to take on faith. The issue before the Supremes
in this case 43 was whether an attorney is liable to third parties, who his
client intended to benefit under a testamentary instrument, if the attor-
ney negligently drafted the instrument so as to deprive the third parties of
the intended benefit. Walter, trust me, to a contracts lawyer that question
almost answers itself. The answer is "yes." This is even true under Texas
contract law, which at times can be pretty weird. We call these third par-
42. Also in defense of my apparent cynicism, let me mention that Bohatch did get to
the jury in her case. What was the trial judge thinking? Result? A jury verdict for
$307,000 actual damages and $4 million in punitives! Walter, I think we may have been a
little correctly concerned earlier about there being danger in letting these juries hash out
these public policy things. So, there's your trouble. Also, I'm a little troubled that the
snitcher was a she and not a he. Walter, you insensitive so and so, that just raises all kinds
of issues I'd just rather not get into right now, if you know what I mean, and you probably
don't. A bunch of us around here have not forgotten your being the first, and only, recipi-
ent of the "Barbie" award given by our women law students.
43. The case is Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. 1996).
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ties "donee" or "intended" beneficiaries. 44
Although the issue was one of first impression for the Supreme Court
of Texas, most, but not all, other jurisdictions have considered the ques-
tion and almost all have answered it affirmatively in favor of liability.
Most of these jurisdictions justify the result by simply applying basic con-
tract law principles. 45 However, when on occasion these courts talk
about policy, they say that allowing a cause of action to the third party is
the very best way, perhaps the only way, to carry out the client's intent.
Walter, the client is dead by the time the mistake is discovered in these
cases, and so he is not about to sue his negligent attorney. The represen-
tative of his estate is not likely to do so either, because in most cases the
estate has suffered no loss attributable to the attorney's negligence. It is
just the beneficiaries that got hurt. Nevertheless, about five states in all
these United States do deny a cause of action to the third party.
Now Walter, you might think that our Court, being as proud as it
thought it was in going along with the majority of states in the Peeler case,
would go right along with the majority here. Particularly when it is a
much greater majority than in the Peeler situation and when, unlike in the
Peeler situation, the majority cases are not distinguishable from the case
before it. Nope. Why not you say? Public policy, Walter. Are you pay-
ing attention? The Court said that it believed "the greater good is served
by preserving a bright-line privity rule which denies a cause of action to
all beneficiaries whom the attorney did not represent. '46 Now I can re-
call a situation or two when I have had some cause for doubt, but I do
believe that most all people, mostly all the time, are in favor of the
greater of two goods. And I will count myself, and you too Walter, right
along with them. It's just that I think most people, non-lawyers and law-
yers-but not will-writing lawyers - would think our Court in Austin is
not a very good picker of goods. I mean one good here is the one the
court picked-protecting lawyers who malpractice and the insurers who
underwrite them. The other good, the one the Court did not pick, is to
hold an attorney responsible for losses he causes to the beneficiaries of
his client's wishes in the exceptional situation where the client himself is
no longer ideally situated to hold that attorney responsible. Walter, as the
poets, ministers, and therapists love to say - "It is an ill wind that blows
44. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 133 (1932); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981).
45. Walter, the courts use these basic contract principles to determine whether or not a
duty is owed to the third party. Once that is established, whether that duty is violated is
determined by the usual negligence/malpractice standards, if you know what I mean, and
you probably don't.
46. Barcelo, 923 S.W.2d at 578. Walter, if you think I'm being a little hard on the court
here, you should read Justice Cornyn's wonderful dissenting opinion in the case. He says
he thought the Court had dedicated itself in recent years to aligning itself with the "main-
stream of American jurisprudence" and that he finds inexplicable the Court's refusal in
Barcelo to follow "the rule in the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions." Id. at 579-80. I
bet Justice Cornyn would have been unhappy to learn that the decision in the Peeler case
was not exactly "mainstream" either.
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no good!" And here we have two goods to choose from, if you know
what I mean, and you might not.
You know, Walter, I read somewhere recently that about sixty percent
of Americans don't like and don't trust lawyers. Now, I think that is just
wrong information. I don't know where they get the people that answer
these polls. I think it's the same sixty percent that think Clinton ought to
be kept in office. The people I talk to never seem to match the polls. I
talk to a lot of different people, and I would say about ninety percent
don't care much one way or another about lawyers, but if it gets down to
the lick log, they think lawyers are alright, not great. About all of them
also think that Clinton ought to be hung by his thumbs. But, regardless,
decisions like that in the Peeler case and these other cases sure don't do
lawyers much good in the public eye in my opinion. What do you think?
I am going to close now. I think you may be happy to hear that. I also
think you will be happy to hear that we might have been onto something
with this distinction between breach of fiduciary duty and simple mal-
practice. You and me have been singled (doubled?) out a time or two for
being country "yahoos," if you know what I mean, and I think you do. I
am not sure why, but I hope this open letter sets the record straight on
that score. I mean we may be "yahoos," Walter, but we're pretty smart
"yahoos," aren't we? I mean us being right on top of this fiduciary mal-
practice thing and all.
Walter, please let me hear from you about all this during one of those
hopefully frequent periods when most of your remaining faculties are op-
erating roughly simultaneously and when you get your land legs back.47
In the meantime, keep a tight line and remember, after casting your




Still Professor of Law***
47. I am sorry to disturb you with all these questions during your retirement. I bet you
were thinking that there are other professional responsibility teachers on the faculty to
whom I could turn. Well, one of them I can't because she went to work for one of the
judges who sided with the majority Supremes in the Peeler case. I am sure, though, that the
case had nothing to do with the judge deciding to do something else. You're going to
laugh, but what he decided to do was become some kind of prosecutor for the public. I
asked the other two ethics professors on our faculty, Bridge and Moss, but they won't give
me any answer without an up-front retainer. Walter, you have certainly left your mark on
your colleagues! Now I know you won't charge me in appreciation for all of the things I
could have said about you in this open letter but did not. I told you they were safe with
me, old buddy.
*** The sense and nonsense that is the above is dedicated with respect and affection to
Walter W. Steele Jr. SMU, this place where I work, is not the same place since Steele
retired. I do not think it is as good a place. But it is still a pretty good place, and some of
that is because of Walter, if you know what I mean, and I think you do.
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